Illusory correlation refers to the perceived (but erroneous) relation between stimuli. In social psychology this phenomenon has been related to stereotype formation. Recent research in this area has shown that the perception of illusory correlation between two groups and their behaviours can be a product of understandable attempts to diåerentiate between these groups. This is due to participants' interpretations of the experimental task and to features that draw attention to group diåerences. In the ®rst study we showed that the task instructions presented to participants can induce expectations of diåerences between the stimulus groups, which helped to produce illusory correlation. We also demonstrated that giving precedence to the behaviours, rather than to the groups, resulted in attenuated illusory correlation eåects. In the second study we investigated how aspects of the stimulus distribution aåected the perception of illusory correlation. In line with the ®rst study, we showed that increasing the focus on the stimulus groups can enhance illusory correlation, whereas focusing on the behaviours can reduce this eåect. The present ®ndings support the self-categorization explanation of illusory correlation that proposes it to be the product of a meaningful category diåerentiation process.
Judgments of covariation are of interest in diåerent domains of psychology including cognitive development (e.g. Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) , clinical assessment (e.g. Chapman & Chapman, 1967) , attribution theory (e.g. Kelley, 1967) , learning theory (Bandura, 1977) and social stereotyping (e.g. Hamilton & Sherman, 1989) . Detecting covariations between stimuli is an essential requirement for adaptive behaviour. The information derived from these relationships allows us to make sense of the world by`explaining the past, controlling the present, and predicting the future' (Crocker, 1981) . All of these are important for our well-being (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) . In this study the authors focus on conditions that bias the perceived covariation of social stimuli, resulting in so-called`illusory correlations'. The term illusory correlation refers to the perception of covariation between two classes of events that are uncorrelated (or less strongly correlated than perceived). Thus, despite the absence of a relationship between stimuli, people still report the perception of such a relationship (hence`illusory'). The perception of illusory correlation has been widely researched in social psychology, not least because this mechanism could oåer an explanation for the acquisition of stereotypes about minorities (Hamilton & Giåord, 1976) . The purpose of the present research is to investigate the pragmatic context of the illusory correlation task in producing illusory correlation eåects. Hamilton & Giåord (1976 ; Study 1) developed the now familiar paradigm to demonstrate the illusory correlation eåect in social perception. They informed participants in their experiment that they would be shown behavioural descriptions about members of two groups, group A and group B, and that in the real world group B is smaller than group A. Consequently, statements describing members of group B would occur less frequently in the stimuli presented. In their study, these two groups exhibited the same ratio of (more) positive to (fewer) negative behaviours (group A positive: 18 ; group A negative : 8 ; group B positive: 9 ; group B negative : 4). Thus, there was no correlation between type of behaviour and group. Despite this, participants associated the minority group B with negative (i.e. minority) behaviour, producing what is termed`distinctiveness-based' illusory correlation. Distinctiveness is determined by statistical infrequency, therefore the perceived correlation involves an association between the distinctive group (the minority group B) and the distinctive behaviours (the negative behaviours), and consequently a relatively negative evaluation of this group. Hamilton & Giåord (1976) argued that the co-occurrence of statistically infrequent categories is particularly distinctive to the perceiver, that they receive more attention, are e¬ciently encoded during stimulus presentation and are consequently more available in memory than non-distinctive categories. Thus, the co-occurrence of distinctive events can result in a negatively biased impression of the minority and subsequent research has shown that this eåect is a reliable phenomenon (see e.g. McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton, 1994 ; Mullen & Johnson, 1990) . However, a number of studies have identi®ed factors that can weaken the distinctiveness-based illusory correlation eåect (Schaller & Maass, 1989 ; Spears, van der Pligt & Eiser, 1985) , or have shown that illusory correlation eåects can occur without statistical infrequency of a particular category (Berndsen, Spears & van der Pligt, 1996 a ; Spears, van der Pligt & Eiser, 1986) .
Recent research has oåered alternative explanations of the eåect demonstrated by Hamilton & Giåord. According to Smith (1991) and Fiedler (1991 ; see also Fiedler, Russer & Gramm, 1993) , the illusory correlation phenomenon is a result of memory biases. By means of computer simulations, Smith demonstrated that memory traces involving the positivity of group A are more easily activated by a prompt than the positivity of group B, because of their greater frequencies. This explanation is closely related to that of Fiedler, who has argued that the illusory correlation pattern is a result of information loss that aåects the majority and minority groups diåerentially. Because of information loss, people's responses are subject to regression eåects that are stronger in small samples (group B) than in large samples (group A). As a consequence, participants' responses result in the typical illusory correlation pattern.
In contrast to these explanations based on biased information processing, McGarty, Haslam, Turner & Oakes (1993) proposed that illusory correlation resulted from attempts to diåerentiate meaningfully between stimulus groups. Their explanation is based on the categorization perspective advanced by Tajfel (e.g. Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) , which assumes that people seek underlying regularities when perceiving stimuli. One way to achieve this is to detect similarities and diåerences, such that between-category diåerences and within-category similarities are accentuated. According to self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) people form categories by maximizing both the diåerences between groups and similarities within groups. This process is based on`comparative ®t' (or the match between the categories and the comparative properties of the stimuli ; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991) . Following this line of reasoning and drawing on the concept of diåerentiated meaning (McGarty & Turner, 1992) , McGarty et al. (1993) argued that participants in the illusory correlation paradigm try to make sense of the stimulus situation by attempting to allocate the stimuli to meaningful (i.e. clear and separable) categories. In their view, the task situation creates expectations such that respondents ask themselves how the groups diåer on the underlying evaluative dimension.
In order to accentuate diåerences between group A and B in the illusory correlation task, participants need to perceive some contrast or diåerence between the two groups (i.e. comparative ®t). McGarty et al. showed that in the original illusory correlation task there is more evidence for the hypothesis that group A members are`good' and group B members are`bad' (181 4 stimuli) than for the opposite hypothesis (91 8 stimuli), presenting a basis for the usual`bias ' found in this task. In short, the stimuli presented in the illusory correlation task provide a basis for the idea that there are genuine diåerences between the stimulus groups.
The purpose of the present study is to investigate McGarty et al.'s proposal that illusory correlation is at least partly the product of a process based on intergroup diåerentiation by investigating features of the illusory correlation task that might contribute to such diåerentiation. One of these aspects relates to the very nature of the experimental situation, and how participants interpret what is expected from them in the task. This view ®ts in well with ideas put forward by a number of researchers about the eåects of the conversational context (Bless, Strack & Schwartz, 1993 ; Grice, 1975 ; Hilton, 1995) . In our view the conversational context also plays a role in experimental settings where the experimenter communicates information to the participants. Participants try to make sense of the situation and the task before them. In doing so they draw on their previous experience and a repertoire of social rules and conventions. When the meaning or the purpose of the task is insu¬ciently speci®ed or explained, participants often feel forced to`go beyond the information given ' in order to make sense of the task they are engaged in. Unfortunately, researchers do not always take this into account (cf. Tajfel, 1972) . For example, Stapel, Reicher & Spears (1995) showed that the availability bias is partly a product of participants' misunderstanding about the true nature of the experimental task, and that the bias was largely eliminated when the purpose of the task became clear. Thus, experimental settings can create expectations about the task that can be diåerent from those originally envisaged by the researchers who devised the paradigm. With respect to the illusory correlation task, it seems reasonable to expect diåerences between the stimulus groups because they are presented by diåerent names. If so, the observed illusory correlation eåects may be a product of these expectations rather than of biased information processing (Berndsen & Spears, 1997) . In the present study we investigate participants' expectations by means of manipulating the instructions presented to them.
STUDY 1
The ®rst study tests whether the instructional context of the standard illusory correlation task aåects the perception of covariation between group membership and the desirability of behaviour. This involves both participants' interpretation of the instructions and the use of the group labels A and B. With respect to these labels, participants might reason to themselves`presumably there must be a diåerence between the two, otherwise why should they be separate groups, and why would the experimenter be asking me to study information about them ? ' (see also McGarty & Turner, 1992) . Moreover, the fact that research on covariation detection suggests that people ®nd it very di¬cult to detect non-contingency (Peterson, 1980) might re¯ect this general expectation. Peterson argued that participants' failure to recognize non-contingency is due to the expectations that they bring to experiments that preclude randomness as a potential description of the experimental task. Nevertheless, researchers working in this ®eld have generally paid very little attention to the possibility of such expectations, presumably because there is no obvious reason for expectations to take a particular direction or form (one of the few exceptions is the work of McGarty & de la Haye, 1997) .
This line of reasoning suggests that illusory correlation might even disappear once this general assumption of group diåerence is undermined. Recent research by Haslam, McGarty & Brown (1996) provided some support for this idea by demonstrating that the illusory correlation eåect is eliminated when the stimulus groups consist of right-and left-handed persons rather than groups A and B. Presumably the evaluative dimension is not relevant in helping to diåerentiate between these groups. However, it is possible that the study of Haslam et al. (1996) does not deal with stereotype formation as is the case in the standard illusory correlation task, because participants might know (from interactions) that there are no clear evaluative diåerences between left-and right-handed people (although there could be other bases to diåerentiate between them). The knowledge or pre-existing stereotype that there are no diåerences may have led to attenuated illusory correlation eåects. In the present study we used stimulus groups of which participants have far less direct knowledge, namely students from previous study years (1993, 1994) . Of course, some participants might know some particular students from '93 or '94, but the point is that there is no obviously general shared knowledge about these student groups as to how they might diåer. Thus, we argue that participants expect that these student groups will not be diåerent from each other, rather than know they do not diåer based on experience. These stimulus groups are therefore more directly related to the issue of stereotype formation than may have been the case for Haslam et al. (1996) .
In one condition of the present study the stimulus groups were presented as group A and group B (as in the standard illusory correlation task), and we predict that participants in this condition expect to ®nd diåerences between the groups. We refer to this condition as the`expectation condition'. In the other condition the stimulus groups consisted of students who started their university study in either 1993 or 1994. We predict that the latter would undermine participants' expectations of ®nding diåerences between the groups of students because of the absence of any meaningful or a priori basis for intergroup diåerentiation. This condition is therefore termed thè no-expectation condition '. The second factor investigated in the present study is also related to the instructions provided in the illusory correlation task. The authors attempted to undermine intergroup diåerentiation by manipulating the instructions. The authors therefore created an instruction in which participants' attention would be drawn to diåerences in behaviour within each group, the idea being that participants should thereby be distracted from diåerentiating between the stimulus groups. This condition is termed the`weak intergroup condition'. Participants in the other condition received the standard instructions as in the study of Hamilton & Giåord (1976) . We refer to this condition as the`standard condition'. If intergroup diåerentiation does play a role in the formation of illusory correlation, participants in the standard condition should display more illusory correlation than participants in the weak intergroup condition. This is because the standard instruction will encourage diåerentiating comparisons between the groups. An instruction that emphasizes intragroup diåerences should reduce attempts to diåerentiate between the groups and attenuates the illusory correlation eåect.
With respect to the perception of illusory correlation, the authors predict an interaction between instruction and expectation such that expecting group diåerences will lead to illusory correlation when participants received the traditional instructions, but not when they received weak intergroup instructions. Expecting no diåerences between the stimulus groups should attenuate the perception of illusory correlation. In other words, the authors only predict an illusory correlation eåect in the condition where participants are presented with the traditional instructions and where they also expect to ®nd group diåerences. In all other conditions, an illusory correlation eåect is not predicted.
Method

Participants and design
Participants were 93 students of the University of Amsterdam who were paid for their participation. This study formed a 2 (instruction : traditional vs. weak intergroup)3 2 (expectation vs. no-expectation) between-participants factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.
Stimulus materials and procedure
In the expectation condition, participants were presented with similar instructions as to those of Hamilton & Giåord (1976) . No-expectations were induced by informing participants that the behaviour came from students of the University of Amsterdam who started their study either in 1993 or in 1994, and that this experiment was part of a large-scale research project in which students of the 1980s were being compared with students of the 1990s. Furthermore, participants were told that, because there were fewer students in 1993 than in 1994, statements describing students of 1993 would occur less frequently. Next, all participants were asked to what extent they expected the groups to be diåerent on a 9-point scale ranging from`not at all diåerent' (1) to`extremely diåerent' (9).
Participants in the weak intergroup condition were asked to detect two distinct types of people (students) in each group (year), in contrast to the traditional condition in which no additional information was provided. Next, participants were provided with the statements (16 positive and 8 negative behaviours from group A or 1994 students, and 8 positive and 4 negative behaviours from group B or 1993 students). After viewing the statements, participants were asked how salient particular information was during the presentation of the stimuli. They indicated their opinions on the following four items using 9-point rating scales ranging from`not at all salient ' (1) to`extremely salient ' (9) : 1. The diåerence between the positive and negative behaviours in group B. 2. The diåerence between the positive and negative behaviours in group A. 3. The diåerence in positive behaviours between group A and group B. 4. The diåerence in negative behaviours between group A and group B.
Items 1 and 2 were designed to measure the degree of intragroup diåerences, and items 3 and 4 measure the degree of intergroup diåerences. Finally, the participants completed the three measures of illusory correlation. In the assignment task, participants again received all the statements without group membership. They were asked to indicate group membership of the person who performed each of the behaviours. For the frequency estimation task, participants were informed that 24 behaviours were from members of group A and 12 behaviours from members of group B. They were asked to estimate how many of the statements about members of both groups described desirable and undesirable behaviours. In the ®nal task, the trait rating task, participants were asked to evaluate groups A and B on four 9-point rating scales :`unpleasant' (1)±`pleasant' (9) ;`friendly ' (1)±`unfriendly ' (9);`unsympathetic' (1)±`sympathetic' (9) ;`reliable ' (1)±`unreliable ' (9).
Results
Manipulation checks
Our prediction that presenting the stimulus groups as group A and B would result in higher ratings of expected diåerences between these groups (M 5 4.93), as compared to the stimulus groups presented as students from 1993 and 1994 (M 5 2.88), was supported: t(91) 5 5.56, p ! .001. In other words, the manipulation of expectation was successful.
With respect to the salience of the presented stimuli, an analysis of variance (MANOVA) with expectations and instructions as between-subjects factors and two within-subjects factors was conducted. The results showed a signi®cant interaction between instruction and intra-vs. intergroup salience (within-subjects factor) (F (1,89) 5 20.70, p ! .001). As expected, with the traditional instructions the between-groups diåerences (MA + B + 5 4.95 ; MA ± B ± 5 4.61) were more salient than with the weak intergroup instructions (MA + B + 5 3.51 ; MA ± B ± 5 3.61) (F (1,89) 5 8.19, p ! .01). This eåect was reversed for the within-group diåerences, which were more salient (F (1,89) 5 14.30, p ! .001) for the weak-intergroup (MA + A ± 5 5.84 ; MB + B ± 5 5.94) than for the traditional instructions (MA + A ± 5 4.09 ; MB + B ± 5 4.48). In short, the manipulation of salience via instructions was successful. Furthermore, expectations about diåerences between the stimulus groups resulted in higher salience ratings of between-group diåerences as compared to no-expectations (F (1,89) 5 6.69, p ! .05). Table 1 reports the means on the three measures of illusory correlation for each condition, with the actual numbers given in parentheses in the ®rst column. In order to test for illusory correlation, a phi coe¬cient was computed from each participant 2 3 2 contingency table derived from the responses on the assignment task and the frequency estimation task. Although it is common practice to transform the phi coe¬cients to Fisher's Z scores (e.g. Hamilton & Giåord, 1976) , research by Haslam & McGarty (1994) showed that such transformations are not justi®ed when the phi and Z scores have no normal distributions. Because of this, we checked the distributions of these scores. After establishing that both phi and Z had generally normal distributions, the phi coe¬cients were converted to Fisher's Z scores and compared to zero. From Table 1 it can be seen that these scores diåered signi®cantly from zero only in the condition with the traditional instructions and expected diåerences between the stimulus groups.
Illusory correlation measures
After recoding the rating scales for`friendly±unfriendly' and`reliable±unreliable ', one evaluative index score was computed based on the four scales of the evaluative rating task (Cronbach's alpha of group A is .74, and of group B is .68). The possible range of the index score was from 1 to 9, a higher rating indicating a more positive evaluation. The mean ratings for group A and group B are presented in Table 1 . As expected, only in the traditional instruction±expectation condition was group B evaluated more negatively than group A.
The predicted interaction between instruction and expectation was signi®cant for the assignment task (F (1,89) 5 7.71, p ! .01) the evaluative rating task (F (1,89) 5 6.18, p ! .05) and approached signi®cance on the estimation task (F (1,89) 5 3.09, p ! .09). As predicted, participants who expected to ®nd diåerences between the stimulus groups displayed illusory correlation eåects when they were presented with the traditional instructions, but not with the weak intergroup instructions (assignment task : F (1,89) 5 4.89, p ! .05 ; estimation task : F (1,89) 5 5.48, p ! .05 ; evaluative rating task : F (1,89) 5 8.85, p ! .01). Having no expectations concerning diåerences between the groups did not result in signi®cant diåerences in illusory correlations between the traditional and weak intergroup instruction (assignment task : F (1,89) 5 2.69, n.s.; estimation task : F (1,89) 5 .01, n.s.; evaluative rating task : F (1,89) 5 .11, n.s.). " Moreover, planned contrasts supported our prediction involving the occurrence of illusory correlation in the condition with the traditional instructions and where diåerences between the groups were expected, as compared to the other conditions (assignment task : F (1,89) 5 5.25, p ! .05 ; estimation task : F (1,89) 5 6.64, p ! .05 ; evaluative rating task : F (1,89) 5 13.28, p ! .001).
Accuracy of assignments
The bottom row in Table 1 reports the proportion of correct responses on the assignment task. With respect to the overall accuracy in recall, there were no signi®cant main eåects of instruction (F (1,89) 5 .12, n.s.) or expectation (F (1,89) 5 .90, n.s.), and there was no signi®cant interaction between these factors (F (1,89) 5 .20, n.s.). 
Discussion
The results of the present study show that labelling the stimulus groups as A and B increased the expectation that these groups would diåer as compared to the case where the groups were labelled as students of '93 and '94. As expected, the weak intergroup instructions emphasized the salience of intragroup diåerences at the expense of intergroup diåerences in contrast to the traditional instructions as shown by the diåerential salience ratings. Moreover, the salience of intergroup diåerences (caused by both the traditional instructions and expectations) tended to be associated with increased illusory correlation eåects. The salience of intragroup diåerences (caused by the weak intergroup instructions) resulted in reduced illusory correlation eåects as compared to the traditional instructions. Thus, the standard instructions seemed to enhance intergroupdiåerentiation although participants were not explicitly asked to do so. The diåerential eåects of instructions and expectations on the perception of illusory correlation cannot be derived from the ideas of Hamilton & Giåord (1976) , Fiedler (1991 ; Fiedler et al., 1993) , and Smith (1991) , because ostensibly these approaches would predict similar levels of illusory correlation in all our conditions. The ®nding that the illusory correlation eåect occurred only in the condition that is similar to the standard illusory correlation task (e.g. Hamilton & Giåord, 1976) indicates that features of the standard task such as the traditional instruction and group labels A and B are important elements in producing intergroup diåerentiation. This supports the ideas of McGarty et al. (1993) that the illusory correlation eåect can arise from meaningfully diåerentiating between the stimulus groups. In the case of an unusual situation such as the illusory correlation task, it seems perfectly rational to expect group diåerences between groups with diåerent names and, consequently, to diåerentiate between these groups.
The fact that stimulus groups simply identi®ed by A and B help to create expectations about diåerences between them is ironic, because the group labels A and B were originally used with the intention of eliminating expectations associated with real groups which might otherwise explain illusory correlations (see Hamilton & Rose, 1980) . In this study, however, meaningful labels eliminated the illusory correlation eåect compared to the meaningless label condition. This suggests that the general expectation that there should be a diåerence between the groups plays an important role in data-based as well as expectation-based illusory correlations. These two types of illusory correlations are usually treated separately because expectationbased illusory correlations are considered as explanations for maintaining stereotypes about socially meaningful groups (e.g. Hamilton & Rose, 1980) , whereas data-based illusory correlations are seen as explanations for the formation of stereotypes (e.g. Hamilton & Sherman, 1989) . Based on the present ®ndings, we would argue that these two types of illusory correlation are not independent, but both deal to some extent with expectations concerning diåerences, irrespective of whether the groups are socially meaningful or meaningless.
There is one possible alternative explanation for the results of the intragroup manipulation. It could be that asking participants to detect two diåerent sorts of people within each group induces an additional task demand that increases cognitive load and that this, rather than salience per se, explains the elimination of illusory correlation. Although it is possible to argue that the illusory correlation eåect actually depends on some degree of load for its operation (i.e. to prevent perfect recall), Stroessner, Hamilton & Mackie (1992) argued that when load is too high this can prevent distinctiveness detection. Although their research used a rather indirect manipulation of load (mood induction), it seems important to consider this possibility. We think that cognitive load cannot explain the present result for two reasons. First, the salience manipulation checks are consistent with the salience-based interpretation. Second, the overall level of accuracy in recall # was not signi®cantly lower for the weak intergroup instruction than for the traditional instruction, # It is worth noting that the overall level of accuracy in recall was not associated with diåerent levels of illusory correlation. Although it is customarily assumed that lack of illusory correlation is related to more accuracy than the occurrence of illusory correlation, the present studies do not support this view. These ®ndings are consistent with other research suggesting that the absence of illusory correlation can be associated with just as much error as signi®cant illusory correlations (McGarty & de la Haye, 1997). Berndsen, van der Pligt, Spears & McGarty (1996b) also demonstrated that the absence of illusory correlations is not necessarily related to more accuracy in recall of the stimuli than when illusory correlations are present. The present ®ndings involving accuracy are also consistent with evidence that covariation biases are not easily eliminated by incentives to be accurate (e.g. Chapman & Chapman, 1982) .
suggesting that load had no signi®cant impact on the ability to recall or encode information per se. The argument that weak intergroup instruction distracted attention from the intergroup comparison is of course precisely the position we are proposing. Taken together, we think that our interpretation in terms of reduced category salience is the most parsimonious and plausible one.
To summarize, the ®rst study showed that diåerent aspects of the instruction in the standard illusory correlation task aåect the perception of illusory correlation. Both the group labels A and B, and the traditional instructions encourage expectations about intergroup diåerences. In the next study we investigate another feature of the illusory correlation task, namely the stimulus distribution.
STUDY 2
According to McGarty et al. (1993) , participants test whether one group is`better ' than the other group. Results of our ®rst study support this view by showing that drawing attention to intragroup diåerences undermined intergroup diåerentiation, and expecting no intergroup diåerences reduced the illusory correlation eåect. These results imply that the group dimension is more focal and has more impact in producing illusory correlation than the behavioural dimension.
Based on this, it seems useful to investigate whether the dominance of the group dimension over the behaviour dimension is aåected by the distribution of the stimuli presented to participants. Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to disentangle the relative contribution of the group and behaviour dimensions of the stimulus distribution to the perception of illusory correlation. In line with the ®rst study, we expect that any emphasis on the group dimension will stimulate comparison between the stimulus groups, resulting in stronger illusory correlations. With respect to the stimulus distribution, one such factor is relative group size. Following Grice's (1975) work on conversational norms as well as our analysis of participants expectations about group diåerences (Study 1), participants might reason that`the presence of a majority and minority group suggests that these groups should diåer on a certain dimension otherwise such a group distinction would not exist.' Greater disparity in group size is likely to provide at least one salient dimension on which the groups already diåer, providing a cue for further diåerentiation.
We hypothesize that large diåerences in group size will increase the salience of the group dimension, and that large diåerences on the behaviour dimension will increase the salience of the behaviour dimension. It then follows from the dominance of the group dimension that the salience of this dimension will result in stronger illusory correlation eåects as compared to the salience of the behaviour dimension. $ In the $ This prediction is in line with research by Ford & Stangor (1992) who showed that group stereotypes emerge when the intragroup diåerences in terms of behaviours are small rather than large. However, an important diåerence between our experiment and that of Ford & Stangor is that in the present study stimulus groups do not diåer from each other, either in their variability of behaviours, or in their means (in all of Ford & Stangor's studies the groups diåer from each other on one or both of these dimensions). The present study therefore adds a novel perspective to research on stereotyping, namely that the group dimension has more impact on stereotyping than the behaviour dimension, and that within the illusory correlation paradigm this should lead to enhanced illusory correlation. latter case the focus will be more on intragroup diåerentiation at the expense of intergroup diåerentiation. We manipulated the salience of each of the two dimensions by varying either the relative frequency of the minority group (group B) or that of the minority behaviour (negative behaviour) according to the distribution in Table 2 .
In the`group-prominent condition ' the group dimension is presumed to be more salient than the behaviour dimension because the number of group B members is smaller (6) than the number of negative behaviours (12), and this increases the diåerence between the groups in terms of group size. This is reversed in thè behaviour-prominent condition' in which the number of negative behaviours is smaller (6) than the number of group B members (12), thereby increasing the diåerence on the behaviour dimension. In the`standard condition', the number of negative behaviours is equal to the number of group B members (12), creating equal salience of the group and behaviour dimensions. We expect that the increased disparity in group size (the ®rst condition) increases the salience of the group dimension, and consequently, facilitates the diåerentiation between groups, leading to greater illusory correlation. With respect to the behaviour-prominent condition, we expect the increased salience of the behaviour dimension to inhibit intergroup diåerentiation, resulting in weaker illusory correlation eåects as compared to the standard condition.
These predictions add to the original explanation of illusory correlation addressed by Hamilton & Giåord (1976) , because their explanation makes no explicit distinction between the relative contribution of the group and behaviour dimension. Based on their distinctiveness hypothesis, we would predict more illusory correlation in both the group-prominent and behaviour-prominent conditions as compared to the standard condition, because the negative behaviours from group B should be more distinctive to the perceiver (cell frequency 2) than in the standard distribution (cell frequency 4). Furthermore, no diåerence between the group-prominent and behaviour-prominent conditions should be expected because they have the same number of distinctive stimuli.
The information loss account proposes that to the extent that the positivity of behaviours is more di¬cult to detect, the minority group is likely to suåer most from this eåect. This means that information loss is stronger for small samples than for large samples resulting in illusory correlation. Following this line of reasoning, the illusory correlation eåects should be the strongest in the group-prominent condition because of the smallest minority group (6 members) compared to the behaviourprominent and standard conditions (12 members). Because of the equal group sizes in the latter conditions, a similar level of illusory correlation should be expected. Smith's (1991) explanation that the illusory correlation eåect is a result of selective access to information in memory suggesting the positivity of group A over group B would lead to similar predictions as the (selective) information loss account.
To summarize, the aim of the second study is to investigate the relative weight of the group dimension and behaviour dimension in the perception of illusory correlations. We predict stronger illusory correlations in the group-prominent condition than in the behaviour-prominent and standard conditions, and stronger illusory correlations in the standard than in the behaviour-prominent condition. This prediction is consistent with the explanation of McGarty et al. (1993) .
As in Study 1, participants rated the salience of the intragroup and intergroup diåerences. We expect that the manipulation of statistical distribution would be re¯ected in the reported salience. This should result in interactions between the conditions and salience ratings. More speci®cally, participants in the groupprominent condition should judge the intergroup diåerences to be more salient than participants in the other conditions, whereas the intragroup diåerences should be judged to be more salient in the behaviour-prominent condition than in the other conditions.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 71 psychology students at the University of Amsterdam, who were paid for their participation. Participants were run in groups of no more than 10 people per session. They were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions: group-prominent condition, the behaviourprominent condition and the standard condition.
Stimulus materials and procedure
In the experiment each participant sat in front of a personal computer. Participants were provided with the same instructions as in Study 1, and presented with stimuli according to the distribution in Table  2 . As shown in this table there is no correlation between group membership and behaviour in any condition. Furthermore, the total number of stimuli presented is the same in the conditions. The stimuli were shown at a rate of 7 seconds per statement. The particular behaviours were rotated between the groups in each distribution while maintaining these distributions. After viewing the statements, participants completed the three measures of illusory correlation as in the ®rst study with an exception involving the frequency estimation task. Participants in the group-prominent condition were informed that 30 behaviours were from members of group A and 6 behaviours from members of group B. Participants in the behaviour-prominent and in the standard conditions were informed that 24 statements came from group A members and 12 from group B members. All participants were asked to estimate how many of the statements about members of both groups described desirable and undesirable behaviours. Finally, they completed the salience questions involving intergroup and intragroup diåerences (see Study 1). In the present study we changed the order of these post-test questions compared to the ®rst study. We did this because we were concerned with the reactivity of the questions and in particular whether asking about particular saliences might cause participants to remain committed to their responses on the subsequent illusory correlation measures.
Results
Manipulation check
The mean ratings for the four post-test items concerning the salience of the presented stimuli are shown in Table 3 . An analysis of variance (MANOVA) resulted in a signi®cant interaction between condition (between-subjects factor) and the intra-vs. intergroup salience (within-subjects factor) (F (2,68) 5 10.36, p ! .001). Further analyses revealed a signi®cant interaction between condition and the intra-items (F (2,68) 5 6.52, p ! .01), and between condition and the inter-items (F (2,68) 5 7.12, p ! .01). As predicted, participants in the group-prominent condition judged the behavioural diåerences between the stimulus groups to be more salient than other participants (compared to behaviour-prominent condition: F (1,68) 5 13.92, p ! .001 ; compared to standard condition: F (1,68) 5 8.58, p ! .01). There were no signi®cant diåerences in salience of intergroup diåerences between the behaviourprominent and standard conditions (F (1,68) 5 .32, n.s.) . Furthermore, and as predicted, diåerences within the stimulus groups were more salient in the behaviourprominent condition than in the other conditions (compared to group-prominent condition : F (1,68) 5 3.91, p ! .05 ; compared to standard condition: F (1,68) 5 9.13, p ! 01). The group-prominent and standard conditions did not diåer signi®cantly in their salience ratings of within-group diåerences (F (1,68) 5 .03, n.s.). In short, the manipulation of salience was successful. Note. Scale is from 1 to 9; higher means indicate more salience. Table 4 shows the means concerning the attribution of behaviours and frequency estimates of positive and negative behaviours in the two groups, for each condition, with the actual numbers given in parentheses. In all conditions the negative behaviours in group B were over-represented. As in Study 1, the phi coe¬cients on the assignment task and the frequency estimation task were computed from each participant's 2 3 2 contingency table. Again, the phi and Fisher's Z distributions were generally normal (Haslam & McGarty, 1994) , and Z scores were used. In each condition the mean transformed phi scores on both tasks were compared to zero, and nearly all of these scores diåered signi®cantly from zero, except that these diåerences approached signi®cance on the assignment task in the behaviour-prominent and standard conditions. .95*** ** p ! .05; *** p ! .01 ; **** p ! .001. a Level at which mean is diåerent from zero (based on one-tailed t tests).
Illusory correlation measures
With respect to the evaluative rating task, the rating scales for`friendly± unfriendly' and`reliable±unreliable ' were recoded to yield one evaluative index score based on the four scales. These rating scales yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .69 (group A) and .75 (group B). The mean ratings for group A and group B are presented in Table 4 . It can be seen that in nearly all conditions group B is evaluated more negatively than group A, although this was nearly signi®cant in the behaviourprominent condition.
The predicted eåect of condition approached signi®cance on the assignment task (F (2,68) 5 2.82, p ! .07) and estimation task (F (2,68) 5 2.51, p ! .09). The interaction between condition and the evaluative ratings of group A and B (withinsubjects factor) was signi®cant (F (2,68) 5 4.86, p ! .05). Planned comparisons revealed that participants in the group-prominent condition displayed generally more illusory correlation as compared with participants in the other conditions. The diåerence in illusory correlation between the group-and behaviour-prominent condition was signi®cant on all measures (assignment task: t(68) 5 2.01, p ! .05 ; estimation task : t(68) 5 2.10, p ! .05 ; evaluative ratings (after computing the diåerence between group A and B) : t(68) 5 3.07, p ! .01). The diåerence in illusory correlation between the group-prominent and standard condition was also signi®cant on the assignment task (t(68) 5 2.13, p ! .05) and on the evaluative ratings (t(68) 5 2.08, p ! .05), and approached signi®cance on the estimation task (t(68) 5 1.78, p ! .09). % In contrast to our prediction, there were no signi®cant diåerences between the behaviour-prominent and standard condition on the three illusory correlation measures (all t ! 1).
Relation between intragroup and intergroup salience and illusory correlation
According to Tajfel (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) categorization occurs to the extent that between-category diåerences and within-category similarities are accentuated. Although we measured the salience of the between-group and within-group diåerences after the illusory correlation measures, we hypothesized that the eåect of condition on the perceived covariation depends upon the salience ratings of these diåerences. Testing the hypothesis assumes a linear relationship between the perceived salience and illusory correlation. However, the relation between the illusory correlation scores and salience might be curvilinear : high salience ratings of intergroup diåerences and low salience ratings of intragroup diåerences could be associated with both positive and negative illusory correlation eåects (i.e. group A is evaluated more positively than group B, or the reverse). This is because in the posttest items we asked for the degree of diåerentiation between and within the groups, and not for the direction of diåerentiation.
In a regression analysis we tested the curvilinear and linear relationships between both the salience ratings of intergroup diåerences and the illusory correlation scores, and the salience ratings of intragroup diåerences and the illusory correlation scores. The results revealed no signi®cant curvilinear or linear relations between the ratings of intragroup diåerences and the scores on either of the illusory correlation measures. The results for the ratings of intergroup diåerences are reported in Table 5 . From Table 5 it can be seen that there were signi®cant linear relations between the salience ratings of intergroup diåerences and the illusory correlation scores on all three measures. Only on the evaluative rating task was there also a signi®cant curvilinear relation. The occurrence of linear, rather than curvilinear, relationships is not surprising because the few negative illusory correlation scores were only slightly negative.
Next, we tested the hypothesis that the eåect of condition on the perceived illusory correlation is mediated by the salience of intergroup diåerences in path analyses % This relatively high p value is due to the limited sample size. Power analysis (Stevens, 1986 ) yielded a power of approximately .28, indicating a very poor chance of ®nding a signi®cant diåerence in this case. In order to obtain adequate power here, twice as many participants would be required. according to the procedures of Baron & Kenny (1986) . As shown before, there was a signi®cant eåect of condition on the mediator (i.e. the salience scores) (F (2,68) 5 7.12, p ! .01), as well as on illusory correlation on the evaluative ratings (F (2,68) 5 4.86, p ! .05). The eåect of condition approached signi®cance on the assignment task (F (2,68) 5 2.82, p ! .07) and on the estimation task (F (2,68) 5 2.51, p ! .09). After controlling for salience of intergroup diåerences, the eåect of condition on illusory correlation decreased to a non-signi®cant level for each measure of illusory correlation (assignment task : F (2,67) 5 1.08, n.s.; estimation task : F (2,67) 5 1.17, n.s.; evaluative ratings: F (2,67) 5 1.91, n.s.). In other words, the perception of illusory correlation rests upon the salience of between-group diåerences.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Results of the second study show that when the group dimension is emphasized by the infrequency of the minority group (group-prominent condition), intergroup diåerences are seen as more salient than without such emphasis on this dimension. An analogues eåect occurred when intragroup diåerences were judged as particularly salient. These results support our assumption that skewed distributions can increase the salience of either the group or behaviour dimension. This study further demonstrates that diåerent statistical distributions aåect the perception of covariation (while the total number of perceived stimuli remains the same). As predicted, participants in the group-prominent condition displayed stronger illusory correlation on all measures of illusory correlation as compared to participants in the behaviour-prominent condition and also on two measures of illusory correlation (see footnote 4) as compared to participants in the standard condition. In other words, the ®ndings of the present study generally indicate that the group dimension has more impact on the perception of illusory correlation than the behaviour dimension.
Unfortunately, our prediction concerning lower levels of illusory correlation in the behaviour-prominent than in the standard condition was not supported. There are a number of possible candidates for explaining this ®nding, for example, memory processes (Fiedler, 1991 ; Fiedler et al., 1993 ; Smith, 1991) , and the distinctiveness account (Hamilton & Giåord, 1976) . However, the present study extends the distinctiveness explanation because there is less illusory correlation in the behaviourprominent than in the group-prominent condition despite the fact that the size of the most infrequent cell remained constant. Therefore, the ®nding that diåerent statistical distributions produce diåerential illusory correlation eåects indicates at least a modi®cation of the paired-distinctiveness explanation such that infrequency on the group dimension has more weight in producing illusory correlation than infrequency on the behaviour dimension.
The similar levels of illusory correlation in the behaviour-prominent and standard conditions suggest that the salience of the group dimension is the main determinant of the illusory correlation eåect, independent of the behaviour dimension. That is, although these conditions are dissimilar with respect to the frequency of the diåerent behaviours, the overall frequency of the behaviours in the groups is equal. Indeed, participants in these conditions indicated no signi®cant diåerences in the judged salience of intergroup diåerences. Moreover, the strong impact of the group component is also supported by the ®nding that the perception of illusory correlation depends upon the salience of intergroup diåerences rather than on the salience of intragroup similarities. Covariation analysis revealed that the manipulation of the statistical distribution aåected the level of illusory correlation by increasing the salience of intergroup diåerences. In other words, illusory correlation increases as a function of perceived between-group diåerences. & The ®nding that the perception of illusory correlation is not aåected by the salience of intragroup similarities in the present study (see also Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963 ) is in contrast with the eåects of the weak intergroup instructions in the ®rst study. These opposing ®ndings could be due to the diåerent manipulations, such that the weak intergroup instructions have more impact in reducing the illusory correlation eåects than extreme disparities on the behaviour dimension of the stimulus distribution. This suggestion is supported by the illusory correlation scores in Tables 1 and 4 . The ®nding that participants in the behaviour-prominent condition still displayed a certain level of illusory correlation could be attributed to the traditional instructions & One might question whether illusory correlation rests upon the task order making the intergroup diåerences salient. This would also call into question the validity of the manipulation check. We would argue that participants' responses on the post-test statements are not confounded with the preceding perception of illusory correlation. First, in introducing the post-test items, we referred to participants' experiences during the stimulus presentation stage. Second, support for the validity of the manipulation check is provided by the diåerential judgments of intragroup salience between the behaviour-prominent and standard condition. This ®nding can be explained by the statistical manipulation, but not by the preceding illusory correlation eåect because the conditions do not diåer in that respect. With respect to the covariate issue and in particular the order of the tasks, we tested whether the judged salience depends upon the preceding perception of illusory correlation. In general, we did not ®nd support for this. An analysis of variance with illusory correlation as the covariate and salience of intergroup diåerences as the dependent variable revealed that the eåect of condition remained signi®cant on all measures of illusory correlation (assignment task (F (2,67) 5 5.13, p ! .01 ; estimation task (F (2,67) 5 5.55, p ! .01) ; evaluative rating task (F (2,67) 5 3.98, p ! .05). Thus, the judged salience of intergroup diåerences could seem not to rest upon the preceding perception of illusory correlation. In short, even though judgments of salience were given after completing the illusory correlation tasks, there is no strong evidence that this order threatened the validity of the manipulation check and the determining role of intergroup salience in the perception of illusory correlation. that enhance intergroup diåerentiation. Thus, this confound could have undermined the expected attenuation of illusory correlation. In summary, with the traditional instructions it is the skewness of the group dimension that drives the illusory correlation eåect, irrespective of a greater skewness on the behaviour dimension. With the weak intergroup instructions the impact of the group dimension disappears.
To summarize, the present studies show that focusing on the group dimension rather than on the behaviour dimension enhances intergroup diåerentiation. In judgment tasks involving two groups, participants try to diåerentiate between groupsbut their responses will also be determined by intragroup diåerences and their expectations about these groups. This conclusion is consistent with self-categorization theory. Our research supports the view that factors drawing attention to the intergroup dimension and intergroup diåerences (by means of instructions or by increasing the skewness on the group dimension) will increase illusory correlation, whereas factors drawing attention to the intragroup dimension and intragroup diåerences will undermine it. Default expectations that the group may diåer may also facilitate the perception of such illusory correlation.
The relevance of these studies is that they show how judgments are governed by the context in which the information is presented and processed. This can be related to the early work of Asch (1952) , who demonstrated that diåerential interpretations of a statement are heavily in¯uenced by the conversational context in which the statement appeared. With respect to the pragmatics of communication in the illusory correlation task, we have shown in a paradigm traditionally proposed to tap a basic cognitive information-processing bias, that the meaning of the presented stimulus material is not ®xed but shaped by participants' inferences about the task. In other words, the construal of the social situation of the experiment and communicative processes help to shape the occurrence of categorization. Rather than re¯ecting the unwanted product of an information-processing bias, illusory correlation can be regarded as a process of meaningful categorical diåerentiation in which people use features of the data, the instructions and their expectations to make sense of the task. This then can be considered as evidence of rational and sensible behaviour (Berndsen & Spears, 1997) .
This view of illusory correlation also has implications for the general issue of stereotyping. The most common view of stereotypic beliefs within social psychology is that they result from cognitive information-processing biases. This is based on the assumption that the information in our social environment is too complex for our processing capabilities, hence we need to simplify this information, which then results in stereotypes (see e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1984 Hamilton, 1981) . According this view, stereotypes are erroneous generalizations based on distorted or illusory perceptions of individuals as group members. The illusory correlation has certainly served to reinforce this view of stereotype formation. However, we have demonstrated that illusory correlations and stereotypes are also dependent upon the interpretation of the experimental task. Even though stereotypes can be exaggerated and erroneous, it is important to understand that they can arise from a rational sensemaking process. If so, the problems associated with stereotyping (prejudice, ethnocentrism) may be better located in social and evaluative factors than in the de®ciencies of psychological functioning.
